導(dǎo)讀：俄烏沖突爆發(fā)后，主要大國(guó)分歧嚴(yán)重，美國(guó)一直試圖逼迫中國(guó)站隊(duì)。最近，觀察者網(wǎng)就俄烏沖突對(duì)中美關(guān)系的影響，以及中美關(guān)系未來(lái)走勢(shì)，采訪了美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、《亞洲時(shí)報(bào)》副主編大衛(wèi)?戈德曼。采訪英文原文附在中文譯文后。

【采訪、翻譯/觀察者網(wǎng) 劉倩藜 編輯/寧櫟】

觀察者網(wǎng)：最近美國(guó)一家偏保守主流報(bào)紙主動(dòng)向您約稿，希望您就俄烏局勢(shì)發(fā)表評(píng)論。但當(dāng)您交稿時(shí)，對(duì)方拒絕予以發(fā)表。對(duì)方說(shuō)了理由嗎？你覺得是怎樣的觀點(diǎn)或表述刺激到了對(duì)方的神經(jīng)？

戈德曼：在那篇評(píng)論中，我說(shuō)俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的爆發(fā)和第一次世界大戰(zhàn)的爆發(fā)非常相似。一戰(zhàn)前，各方基于各自利益，采取了理性行動(dòng)，但共同制造了一場(chǎng)災(zāi)難。

面對(duì)當(dāng)前俄烏局勢(shì)，幾乎所有美國(guó)主流報(bào)紙的社論立場(chǎng)都是把責(zé)任歸咎于俄羅斯。我并不是在為俄羅斯向?yàn)蹩颂m發(fā)動(dòng)攻擊做辯護(hù)，但引發(fā)俄羅斯行動(dòng)的是西方不斷將北約東擴(kuò)至俄羅斯邊境的行為。包括亨利·基辛格（美國(guó)前國(guó)務(wù)卿）、威廉·伯恩斯（美中央情報(bào)局局長(zhǎng)、美國(guó)前駐俄羅斯大使）在內(nèi)的許多美國(guó)人都曾警告北約不要擴(kuò)張，并預(yù)測(cè)了當(dāng)前這一災(zāi)難性后果。盡管事實(shí)已證明這些警告是正確的，但大多數(shù)美國(guó)主流媒體在報(bào)道這次俄羅斯對(duì)烏開展軍事行動(dòng)時(shí)拒絕談及歷史脈絡(luò)。

2014年《華盛頓郵報(bào)》發(fā)表基辛格文章《解決烏克蘭危機(jī)要“以終為始”》

觀察者網(wǎng)：中國(guó)有可能調(diào)解俄烏沖突嗎？

戈德曼：這當(dāng)然是可能的。3月9日我在《亞洲時(shí)報(bào)》上提到了這一點(diǎn)；3月13日中國(guó)與全球化智庫(kù)王輝耀博士在《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》上也提出了這一觀點(diǎn)。中國(guó)是俄羅斯和烏克蘭的主要貿(mào)易伙伴，烏克蘭是最早參與“一帶一路”倡議的國(guó)家之一。中國(guó)有資源，可以提出幫助戰(zhàn)后重建，以此促談，推動(dòng)雙方達(dá)成妥協(xié)。但調(diào)解取決于雙方是否有意愿妥協(xié)。

目前還不清楚俄方會(huì)愿意接受什么樣的妥協(xié)。烏克蘭的立場(chǎng)也很難解讀，因?yàn)闉蹩偨y(tǒng)澤連斯基在一些場(chǎng)合提到愿意妥協(xié)，在另外一些場(chǎng)合又把俄羅斯比作二戰(zhàn)期間的納粹德國(guó)，但納粹德國(guó)畢竟是個(gè)邪惡存在，和它達(dá)成妥協(xié)是不可能的。

在不愿妥協(xié)的雙方之間進(jìn)行調(diào)解是有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的，因?yàn)橐坏┱{(diào)停失敗，外界可能會(huì)“甩鍋”給這個(gè)調(diào)解人。不過(guò)，我仍然認(rèn)為，如果走出這一步對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)是積極的。

觀察者網(wǎng)：歐美禁止進(jìn)口俄羅斯能源后，又紛紛向拉美、中東產(chǎn)油國(guó)家求助。這個(gè)進(jìn)口結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整，會(huì)對(duì)全球能源市場(chǎng)帶來(lái)什么影響？

戈德曼：美國(guó)和歐洲正和海灣國(guó)家石油出口國(guó)談判，希望取代俄羅斯的能源生產(chǎn)。我不知道美國(guó)為了獲取海灣國(guó)家在能源市場(chǎng)上的幫助，美方會(huì)愿意做出怎樣的讓步。很明顯，沙特阿拉伯希望美國(guó)在安全事務(wù)上提供幫助，尤其針對(duì)也門武裝分子在沙特境內(nèi)的襲擊。

歐洲國(guó)家仍然沒(méi)有對(duì)俄羅斯石油和天然氣展開制裁，雙方仍在交易。印度在增購(gòu)俄羅斯石油，部分訂單價(jià)格甚至低于市場(chǎng)價(jià)格。2022年3月能源市場(chǎng)的動(dòng)蕩比2月時(shí)許多分析師預(yù)測(cè)的情況要溫和得多。

所以目前還沒(méi)出現(xiàn)結(jié)構(gòu)性的變化。除非歐洲改變主意，決定對(duì)俄羅斯石油加以制裁，否則能源市場(chǎng)不會(huì)出現(xiàn)結(jié)構(gòu)性改變。當(dāng)然，為了獲取能源，歐洲肯定會(huì)尋求替代方案，比如德國(guó)正加大從卡塔爾采購(gòu)天然氣的力度。但歐洲要做到能源多樣化需要大量投資和時(shí)間。

歐洲國(guó)家依賴俄國(guó)天然氣（來(lái)源：STATISTA，漢化：觀察者網(wǎng)吳辰晨）

觀察者網(wǎng)：目前美國(guó)正面臨嚴(yán)重的通貨膨脹，2月消費(fèi)者價(jià)格指數(shù)CPI同比上漲達(dá)到7.9%，創(chuàng)下1982年1月以來(lái)最大同比漲幅。在這樣的背景下，美國(guó)依然制裁俄羅斯，并且與中國(guó)維持貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，這樣的舉措是否真正對(duì)美國(guó)民眾有利？

戈德曼：這取決于你如何看待“美國(guó)人民的利益”。特朗普總統(tǒng)以為，他可以通過(guò)對(duì)中國(guó)商品加征關(guān)稅來(lái)保護(hù)美國(guó)人的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)，這些措施于2019年9月生效。

但據(jù)我計(jì)算，從2019年9月到2021年12月，美國(guó)從中國(guó)的進(jìn)口反而增長(zhǎng)了46%。顯然那些措施是無(wú)效的，美國(guó)不僅沒(méi)能在國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)替代產(chǎn)品，反而讓美國(guó)人在購(gòu)買中國(guó)商品時(shí)支付了更高的價(jià)格。就是說(shuō)，加征關(guān)稅既沒(méi)能提高美國(guó)產(chǎn)品競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，也沒(méi)能加強(qiáng)美國(guó)公司在國(guó)內(nèi)投資制造業(yè)的意愿。我認(rèn)為，需要采取有力的辦法來(lái)改善美國(guó)制造業(yè)，但關(guān)稅手段弊大于利。

面對(duì)俄羅斯時(shí)，無(wú)論是美國(guó)還是其它國(guó)家，總是優(yōu)先考慮國(guó)家安全，短期的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益次之。在北約國(guó)家邊界采取武力，雖然符合美國(guó)對(duì)安全問(wèn)題的關(guān)切，但如果美國(guó)能與法、德一道支持新明斯克協(xié)議，支持通過(guò)談判解決烏克蘭問(wèn)題的話，這次俄烏危機(jī)本可以避免。

當(dāng)然會(huì)有人說(shuō)，制裁俄羅斯導(dǎo)致的油價(jià)上漲的確給美國(guó)人帶來(lái)了經(jīng)濟(jì)痛苦，不過(guò)為了美國(guó)的安全，這些對(duì)俄制裁是合理的。但是，如果在危機(jī)爆發(fā)前各方就通過(guò)協(xié)商達(dá)成解決方案，美國(guó)的安全反而能更好地被保障。

俄方在聯(lián)合國(guó)演講時(shí)西方代表傲慢地用退場(chǎng)施壓（來(lái)源：法新社）

觀察者網(wǎng)：未來(lái)，中美雙方是否可能在科技層面繼續(xù)開展多方位、多層面的合作？

戈德曼：應(yīng)該說(shuō)，前景比較暗淡。接下來(lái)一段時(shí)間，烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的陰影仍將籠罩，這會(huì)讓美國(guó)向中國(guó)持續(xù)施壓，勸阻中國(guó)向俄羅斯提供幫助。

當(dāng)然，中美之間的技術(shù)合作已經(jīng)很廣泛。美國(guó)每年購(gòu)買價(jià)值6000億美元的中國(guó)產(chǎn)品，我們用的電子消費(fèi)品很多來(lái)自中國(guó)。美國(guó)公司在中國(guó)有大量研發(fā)和生產(chǎn)設(shè)施。盡管中美之間在特定領(lǐng)域的制裁阻礙了雙邊的技術(shù)合作，但歷史上中美經(jīng)濟(jì)體從未像現(xiàn)在這樣深度融合。幾十年來(lái)，民營(yíng)企業(yè)和私營(yíng)部門一直在促進(jìn)這種合作。

此外，美方在某些領(lǐng)域的研究很難脫離中國(guó)開展，比如基于大數(shù)據(jù)的醫(yī)學(xué)研究，需要依托中國(guó)豐富的醫(yī)療數(shù)據(jù)。制造智能手機(jī)芯片、提供芯片開發(fā)軟件和芯片制造設(shè)備的美國(guó)企業(yè)也依賴中國(guó)客戶。如果兩國(guó)沒(méi)有出臺(tái)打壓雙邊科技合作的措施，我相信民營(yíng)企業(yè)和私營(yíng)部門會(huì)繼續(xù)擴(kuò)大技術(shù)合作。

觀察者網(wǎng)：美方經(jīng)常指責(zé)中方信息溝通不透明，但我們看到大量西方媒體對(duì)公眾提供的信息都是經(jīng)過(guò)嚴(yán)格篩選的。您認(rèn)為這種“信息繭房”帶來(lái)的認(rèn)知偏差是否會(huì)妨礙美國(guó)人民了解真實(shí)的中國(guó)，從而影響美國(guó)整體在處理對(duì)華關(guān)系時(shí)做出明智決策?

戈德曼：在美國(guó)，我們已經(jīng)看到了一些令人不安的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)審查案例。比如2021年1月6日國(guó)會(huì)山發(fā)生騷亂事件后，時(shí)任總統(tǒng)特朗普的社交媒體Twitter賬號(hào)被封。

又比如，在美國(guó)2020美國(guó)大選之前，《紐約郵報(bào)》揭露拜登家族涉嫌不正當(dāng)商業(yè)關(guān)系。對(duì)此，美國(guó)51位退休的高級(jí)情報(bào)官員聯(lián)名發(fā)聲，稱該報(bào)的報(bào)道是俄羅斯的虛假信息行動(dòng)，大型社交媒體平臺(tái)還壓制這篇報(bào)道。但是最近那些報(bào)道得到了證實(shí)。

以上這些都是美國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)審查工作令人擔(dān)憂的情況，但我不認(rèn)為這與美國(guó)人如何看待中國(guó)有多大關(guān)系。和中國(guó)相關(guān)的信息，與其說(shuō)是被壓制，不如說(shuō)是被忽略。美國(guó)人有點(diǎn)活在自己的世界里。目前有30多萬(wàn)中國(guó)人在美國(guó)大學(xué)學(xué)習(xí)，但只有2萬(wàn)美國(guó)人在中國(guó)學(xué)習(xí)。中國(guó)文明與西方文明有很大不同，要理解個(gè)中緣由，需要花時(shí)間、花功夫。

我們常聽到一種說(shuō)法：美國(guó)幫助中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展是個(gè)錯(cuò)誤，比如支持中國(guó)加入世界貿(mào)易組織，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)以為經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮會(huì)使中國(guó)成為像美國(guó)一樣自由民主的國(guó)家。事實(shí)上，很多美國(guó)人都是這么認(rèn)為的。因?yàn)槲覀兪且粋€(gè)吸收來(lái)自全世界移民的國(guó)家，包括來(lái)自中國(guó)的移民，所以我們想當(dāng)然地認(rèn)為全世界其它地方的人自然會(huì)變得越來(lái)越像我們。

同不少國(guó)家一樣，我們喜歡把自己的失敗歸咎于外界，我們有時(shí)會(huì)很不公平地把美國(guó)自己的失敗和中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)騰飛相關(guān)聯(lián)。在我看來(lái)，中國(guó)是一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，但它的成功應(yīng)該激勵(lì)美國(guó)人放下自滿，更加努力工作，讓我們的科技保持領(lǐng)跑地位。我希望中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮，穩(wěn)定發(fā)展，但比美國(guó)落后一步。但是，美國(guó)只有自己跑得更快才能做到這一點(diǎn)，而不是想著絆倒中國(guó)。

（作者信息：大衛(wèi)戈德曼現(xiàn)任《亞洲時(shí)報(bào)》(Asia Times)副主編。1973年畢業(yè)于美國(guó)哥倫比亞大學(xué)，后在紐約城市大學(xué)獲得音樂(lè)理論碩士學(xué)位，在金融、投行領(lǐng)域從業(yè)32年，常年在美國(guó)《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》、《彭博新聞周刊》發(fā)表時(shí)評(píng)，著有《你將被同化：中國(guó)式改造世界的計(jì)劃》(You Will Be Assimilated: China's Plan to Sino-form the World )一書。）

Guancha: Previously the editorial page of a US newspaper asked you for an Op-editorial on Ukraine. But when you finished writing, they refused to publish it. What was the reason they gave you, if any? What viewpoints or expressions that got their nerves?

Goldman: I argued that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine resembled the outbreak of the First World War, when all sides acted rationally according to their perceived self-interest and together created a disaster. The editorial position of all the major US newspapers assigns unilateral blame to Russia. I do not defend Russia’s attack on Ukraine, but it was set in motion by Western efforts to expand NATO to Russia’s border. In the past many prominent Americans, including Henry Kissinger as well as the present CIA chief William Burns, warned against expanding NATO and predicted exactly this disastrous outcome. But now that their warnings have proven correct, it is unacceptable to provide any context for Russia’s action in most of the major media.

Guancha: Could China mediate the Ukraine war?

Goldman: This is certainly possible. I made this argument in Asia Times on March 9. Dr. Huiyao Wang, the director of the Center for China and Globalization, proposed this in the New York Times on March 13. China is a major trading partner of both Russia and Ukraine, and Ukraine was one of the first countries to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative. China also has the resources to offer incentives for compromise in the form of reconstruction aid. But mediation depends on the readiness of both sides to compromise.

It is not clear what Russia might be willing to accept in the way of compromise. The Ukrainian position is also hard to read, because President Zelensky has talked about compromise on some occasions, and on other occasions compared Russia to Nazi Germany during World War II, that is, an evil entity with whom no compromise is possible. It is risky to mediate between two sides who do not want to compromise, because the mediator might be blamed for failure. Nonetheless I think it would be a positive step for China to try.

Guancha: After banning the Energy imports from Russia, US and Europe have turned to Latin America and Middle East countries. Will there be any structural change to the global energy landscape?

Goldman: The United States and Europe are negotiating with the oil exporters of the Persian Gulf to replace Russian energy production. I do not know what the United States is willing to concede to the Gulf countries in return for help in the energy market. It seems clear that Saudi Arabia wants the United States to help on security issues, notably the insurgency in Yemen backed by Iran.

Meanwhile Russian oil and gas continue to trade in the absence of European sanctions, while India has bought additional Russian oil, some at a discount to market prices. The disruption in the energy market is far milder than many analysts feared in February. For the time being there is no structural change. Unless Europe changes its mind about sanctions on Russian oil, there will be no structural change. Europe, to be sure, will look for alternate energy sources. Germany is buying more gas from Qatar, for example. But persification of energy sources requires a lot of investment and a lot of time.

Guancha: Many countries are loosening up restriction, while China is sticking to the Zero-Covid policy. Will China be excluded in the Global economy in the long run?

Goldman: I’m not qualified to answer questions about epidemiology.

Guancha: Given the high inflation domestically in the US, are waging sanctions against Russia and a trade war with China simultaneously in the interests of American people?

Goldman: It depends how you view the interests of the American people. President Trump thought he would protect American jobs by imposing tariffs on imports from China, which went into effect in September 2019. But US imports from China rose by 46% by my calculation between September 2019 and December 2021. Clearly these were ineffective, because Americans paid higher prices for Chinese goods, rather than producing alternative goods at home. Tariffs failed to improve the competitiveness of American products, or the willingness of American business to invest in manufacturing. I believe that vigorous action is needed to improve American manufacturing, but tariffs do more harm than good.

Regarding Russia, national security always takes precedence over short-term economic convenience, in the United States as well as other countries. The use of force on the borders of NATO countries is a security concern of the United States. But in this case, the crisis could have been avoided if Washington had joined France and Germany in supporting the Minsk II framework for a negotiated solution in Ukraine. In the narrow sense, one could argue that the Russia sanctions entailed economic pain for Americans in the form of higher oil prices, but were justified to protect American security. But American security would have been served better through a negotiated solution before the crisis.

Guancha: Any possibility for China and the US to foster all-round/all-level technology cooperation in the near future?

Goldman: The outlook for the near future is bleak. The very near future is clouded by the Ukraine war, which motivates Washington to put more pressure on China in order to dissuade China from giving help to Russia. Of course, technological cooperation between the United States and China is already enormous. America buys $600 billion a year of Chinese products, including most of our consumer electronics. US companies have extensive production as well as research facilities in China. The two economies never have been more integrated, despite specific sanctions that stop certain areas of technological cooperation. Private business has fostered this cooperation for decades.

There are some areas of research, moreover, that are difficult to conduct outside of China, for example, Big Data medical research that draws on China’s abundance of medical data. American companies that make chip development software tools and chip-building machines depend on Chinese customers, as to the makers of smartphone chips. In the absence of specific action to suppress technological cooperation, private business will continue to expand it.

Guancha: While the US is accusing China for its lack of transparency in information and communication, we have always witnessed how strictly the info provided by many western media are selected. Do you think the Information Cocoons would hinder the understanding of American people of China, thus jeopardizing the Americans’ decision of ways dealing with China?

Goldman:We have had some disturbing examples of censorship, for example the suspension of Donald Trump’s Twitter account after the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol Hill riot, or the suppression of a New York Post report about alleged improper business relationships in the Biden family just before the last presidential election. At the time, 51 retired senior US intelligence officers published a statement claiming that the New York Post story was a Russian disinformation operation, and the big social media platforms suppressed the report. Recently, the New York Post story was confirmed.

These are worrying developments, but I don’t think they have much to do with American perceptions of China. The relevant information isn’t suppressed so much as ignored. Americans are very insular. More than 300,000 Chinese now study at US universities, while only 20,000 Americans study in China. Chinese civilization is very different from the West, and it takes time and effort to understand why.

One hears all the time that America made a mistake in helping China’s economic development, for example by supporting China’s membership in the World Trade Organization, because America believed that prosperity would lead China to become a liberal democracy like the United States. In fact, many Americans believed this; because we are a nation that absorbs immigrants from the whole world, including China, we assume that the rest of the world naturally should become more and more like us.

Like many countries, we like to blame outsiders for our own failings, and we associate China’s remarkable economic growth with some of our own failures, sometimes unfairly. In my view, China is a formidable competitor, and its successes should motivate Americans to abandon our complacency and work harder to maintain our technological leadership. I want China to be prosperous, secure, and a step behind the United States. But American can achieve this only by running faster, not by tripping China.

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